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Abstract
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to over-invest in
their companies. A number of theoretical contributions have aimed at explaining this
stylized fact, most of them focusing on a fundamental agency problem between sharehol-
ders and managers. The present paper shows that over-investments are not necessarily
the (negative) consequence of agency problems between shareholders and managers,
but instead might be a second-best optimal response to address problems of limited
commitment and limited liquidity. If a firm has to rely on relational contracts to mo-
tivate its workforce, and if it faces a volatile environment, investments into general,
non-relationship-specific, capital can increase the efficiency of a firm’s labor relations.
JEL Codes: C73, D21, D86, G32
Keywords: relational contracts, corporate finance, capital investments
∗We thank Dan Barron, Sean Chu, Oscar Contreras, Wouter Dessein, Bob Gibbons, Sebastian Kranz,
Jin Li, James Malcomson, Stefanos Mouzas, Mike Powell, Heiner Schumacher, Carmit Segal, Caspar Siegert,
Roland Straussz and participants at the 2012 IIOC (Washington), the 2012 Conference of the German
Economics Association (Goettingen), the 2013 European Meeting of the Econometric Society (Gothenborg)
and the 2016 SIOE meeting (Paris) for helpful comments. Two anonymous referees were very helpful in
sharpening the paper’s contribution. Financial support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC
TRR 190 is gratefully acknowledged.
†LMU Munich & CESifo & Organizations Research Group (ORG); florian.englmaier@econ.lmu.de
‡JKU Linz & CESifo; matthias.fahn@jku.at
1 Introduction
A prominent and well established stylized fact in corporate finance is that managers tend to
over-invest, or, as Stein (2003) puts it, that they “...have an excessive taste for running large
firms, as opposed to simply profitable ones” (p. 119). Numerous theories have been deve-
loped to explain this pattern: managers’ taste for empire building (see Williamson (1964),
Jensen (1986), Jensen (1993)), short-termism of managers who focus on activities the market
can easily observe, (see Stein (1989), Bebchuk and Stole (1993)), managerial overconfidence
into their own abilities (Roll (1986), Heaton (2002)), or asymmetric information with respect
to new investment opportunities (see Inderst and Klein (2007)). All these theories share the
perception that over-investments are caused by agency problems between a firm and its ma-
nagement. Hence, mechanisms to reduce free cash-flow – and consequently the management’s
ability to invest – have been suggested as optimal responses to this perceived fundamental
agency problem. However, there is no clear evidence that reducing a firm’s free cash-flow
and restricting a manager’s investment opportunities increases firm value – on the contrary,
investors often assess capital investments positively (see McConnell and Muscarella (1985),
Myers (2003)).
This paper shows that investments into general, liquidity-generating, capital can have a
positive impact on firm value, namely by making it easier to motivate a firm’s workforce. If
a firm cannot use formal, court-enforceable contracts to provide incentives, and if payments
used to compensate its workforce is constrained by the firm’s volatile revenues, the scope
of incentive provision is limited. Then, the combination of limited commitment and limited
liquidity may cause an inefficiently low productivity. In this case, over-investments – inves-
tments where marginal costs exceed (direct) marginal benefits – can improve the power of
the firm’s incentive system because capital investments increase the firm’s financial flexibi-
lity as well as its commitment by generating additional cash flow. Hence, over-investments
partially mitigate contracting frictions, and are not necessarily an inefficient manifestation
of intra-firm agency problems.
More precisely, we develop a model where a principal needs physical capital and an agent’s
effort to produce, and the time horizon is infinite. Effort is potentially exerted in every
period and increases output. Capital investments are made at the beginning of the game and
increase output as well. The agent has to be motivated to exert effort, however neither his
effort nor potential performance signals are verifiable. Therefore, relational contracts where
the firm implicitly promises to reward performance have to be employed to incentivize the
agent. There, the principal only has an incentive to honor her promises if the net present
value of the firm’s profits is sufficiently large. This constraint on credible promises limits
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the level of enforceable effort if the discount factor is small. In addition to this standard
credibility problem of relational contracts, we consider the effect of a volatile environment on
the principal’s ability to make desired payments. It turns out that taking this into account can
restrict enforceable effort even for relatively large discount factors. In particular, we assume
that the principal is exposed to varying market conditions, i.e., demand may be either high
or low. The principal faces a liquidity constraint and can only use generated cash-flow –
funds that have been earned by selling the output – to compensate the agent. Under this
assumption the agent’s compensation is likely to vary with the principal’s earnings, and high
demand be associated with higher payments to the agent. However, the maximum amount
the principal is willing to pay out instead of reneging and shutting down is determined by her
expected future profits, independent of the differences in available liquidity between states
of the world. A big difference between the revenues in good and bad states, and hence
higher payment obligations in the good state, increases the principal’s reneging temptation
and limits enforceable effort to an inefficiently low level even if the discount factor is close
to 1. Therefore, the very combination of a liquidity constraint and the absence of formal
enforcement triggers efficiency reductions even for rather large discount factors.
The principal can mitigate this problem by (seemingly excessive) investments into physical
capital. We start by assuming that investments are not relationship specific, hence can be
re-sold at any time for the initial purchasing price. Higher investment levels raise the output
in all states and therefore increase the available cash-flow also in low-demand states, i.e.,
when the liquidity constraint binds. This direct positive effect of a higher liquidity in bad
states is further amplified by an indirect credibility effect that helps in good states: Because a
higher effort level can be implemented due to the additional liquidity in low-demand states,
expected profits today and in all future periods go up. This allows to credibly promise a
higher bonus in high-demand states (recall that effort is restricted by the combination of
limited liquidity in bad and limited commitment in good states) and consequently to further
increase implemented effort. In this context, over-investments – i.e., capital levels where the
marginal investment costs exceed the direct marginal benefits – are potentially optimal.
This result is remarkable in comparison to the “classic” corporate finance literature where
over-investments are interpreted as a consequence of agency problems between shareholders
and management: Means to reduce free cash-flow – like issuing debt – are proposed as
(second-best) solutions to the problem of over-investments; see, e.g., Hart and Moore (1995),
Zwiebel (1996). We show that the additional cash-flow generated by over-investments can
be used to increase the firm’s financial flexibility and mitigate an agency problem between
the firm and its workforce.
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Because we consider investments into general, non-relationship-specific, capital, over-
investments are not optimal for low discount factors, where only limited commitment and
not limited liquidity is a problem. This changes in Section 6.1, where we assume that the asset
is relationship-specific in a sense that its resale value is smaller than the initially invested
amount. Then, investment costs are (partially) sunk and thus not (fully) considered by the
principal whenever she faces the decision whether to keep her promises in the relational
contract or not. Due to sunk investment costs, and as an increased capital base positively
affects future rents, investments into capital improve the enforceability of relational contracts
and consequently also attenuate pure credibility problems. Then, over-investments can also
be optimal for rather low discount factors. This positive interaction between relationship-
specific up-front investments and the enforceability of relational contracts has previously been
identified by Halac (2015). She analyzes a setting where a principal and an agent interact
repeatedly, and the principal has to make an ex-ante relationship-specific investment. This
standard hold-up problem induces the principal to under-invest if she fears that the returns
from this investment will ex-post be expropriated by the agent. Then, the inability to use
formal contracts may increase the efficiency of the relationship, by a logic similar to ours:
A higher relationship-specific investment increases the benefits of keeping the relationship
going, reduces the reneging temptation and thereby increases effort in the relational contract.
Different from Halac (2015), we show that over-investments not only increase the value of
the relationship by creating quasi-rents that are lost after a deviation, but also mitigate
problems generated by volatile returns. In addition we show that over-investments can even
be optimal with general, non-relationship-specific, capital – a result that is not present in the
setup of Halac (2015). In Section 6.1., we further conduct comparative statics with respect
to the liquidation value of the asset. If it increases (which implies that the asset becomes
less relationship specific), the effect on investments is ambiguous, and the scope for over-
investments might actually go up: On the one hand, the benefits of over-investments then
go down because the associated increase in the firm’s outside option is more pronounced
for larger investments. On the other hand, the principal’s outside option becomes more
attractive, which fosters her incentives to deviate and therefore increases the benefits of
over-investments.
Our results also appear related to Klein and Leffler (1981). There, up-front relationship
specific investments are sunk and so allow future rents to be used as a bond to ensure
performance. However, those investments do not affect productivity but instead are necessary
to sustain an equilibrium with high performance in a market environment, by dissipating rents
and consequently restricting firm entry.
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In our benchmark case, we assume that the firm is neither able to enter a credit market,
nor to hoard cash in order to deal with liquidity shortages. Especially the latter assumption
not only simplifies our analysis, but also seems to describe the reality in a number of instances.
There are a variety of reasons for why firms are not able to keep large amounts of cash. For
example, short-sighted shareholders may insist on paying out cash or investing it in higher
return but less liquid assets. In such cases, this paper argues that a second-best option
might be to invest in stable, cash generating business. However, we also show that even if
we introduce a credit market (Section 6.2), and even allow for cash holdings (Section 6.3),
over-investments continue to be a viable instrument to improve the performance of a firm’s
incentive system.
Related Literature
The starting point of this paper is the moral hazard principal agent literature which focuses
on unobservable effort choice as a determinant of firm profitability (or productivity). An
improved solution to the moral hazard problem will, ceteris paribus, increase productivity.
While there exists a large literature, building on Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart
(1983), focusing on explicit contracts that reward the agent based on verifiable performance
measures, there has been an increased interest in implicit contracts as a way to mitigate the
moral hazard problem; see, e.g., Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Levin (2003).
In a more recent contribution, Gibbons and Henderson (2013) argue that different aspects
of relational contracts are responsible for observed persistent performance differences among
seemingly similar enterprises that also exist within industrialized countries.
Relational (or implicit) contracts employ repeated-game logic to use observable but un-
verifiable information and do not rely on explicit, court-enforceable, performance measures
to motivate workers. The performance of relational contracts is generally restricted by an
insufficient discounted future value of the relationship. This credibility problem hence ce-
teris paribus is more severe if players have rather low discount factors. The present paper
introduces a liquidity problem and shows that the efficiency of relational contracts can also
be restricted by volatile returns, even if discount factors are rather large. In the recent past
there have been a number of papers investigating richer dynamics and the effect of stochastic
shocks on the efficiency and stability of implicit contracts – see, e.g., Li and Matouschek
(2013), Englmaier and Segal (2011) – to which the present paper relates. In addition, we
relate to some recent papers linking a firm’s financing conditions and decisions to the enfor-
ceability of relational contracts. Contreras (2013) analyzes how relational contracts formed
between a firm and its supplier interact with the quality of financial markets. Fahn, Merlo,
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and Wamser (2017) show how equity financing helps to enforce relational contracts. Debt
increases a firm’s reneging temptation because some of the negative consequences of brea-
king implicit promises can be shifted to creditors. In a related vein, Barron and Li (2015)
explore how the negative effect of debt on the enforceability of relational contracts affects
firm dynamics. They show that it is optimal for firms to first meet its financial obligations
at the expense of having low compensation and effort levels in early periods.
2 Model Setup
We first characterize the basic model. In the next subsection we will describe the informatio-
nal structure of the game. There is one principal (“she”) and one agent (“he”). The principal
needs two inputs for production, capital and the agent’s effort. Time is discrete, the time
horizon infinite; principal and agent are risk-neutral and share a common discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1). In the first period of the game, t = 0, the principal makes capital investments
k ∈ [0, k], where k is assumed to be large enough. Capital investments are associated with
marginal investment costs of 1. They can either be funded by the principal herself or raised
from (passive) outside investors who provide equity. To sharpen our arguments, we abstract
from any agency conflicts between the principal and outside shareholders, and assume that
the latter automatically receive their fair share of residual profits. Furthermore, we assume
that the asset is not relationship-specific and can be resold at the end of every period, for a
value k. Below, in Section 6.1, we allow for asset specificity in the sense that the resale value
is below k. We also assume that the asset can only be liquidated as a whole and not parts
of it, and that the game is over once the asset has been sold.
In every period t = 1, 2, ..., the firm makes a short-term employment offer to the agent;
this offer consists of a fixed wage wt ≥ 0 and the promise to make a contingent bonus payment
bt ≥ 0. This bonus promise provides the agent with incentives and is paid at the principal’s
discretion.
The agent’s decision whether to accept an offer or not is captured by dt ∈ {0, 1}, where
dt = 1 describes an acceptance and dt = 0 a rejection. After accepting an offer, the agent
makes his effort choice et. Effort is continuous, et ∈ [0, e], where e is assumed to be large
enough, and associated with linear effort costs c · et, where c > 0.
If the agent rejects the principal’s offer, the principal consumes her outside option π ≥ 0,
and the agent consumes his outside option u ≥ 0 in the respective period.
The output generated in period t is yt = f (et, k). f (et, k) is a continuous function in
both arguments, with fe, fk > 0 and fee, fkk < 0. For simplicity, and without affecting any
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of our qualitative results, we further assume fek = 0, with one exception: f(0, kt) = 0 for
all kt ≥ 0. Therefore, at least some effort by the agent is needed for a productive use of the
asset.
After producing, the principal sells the output and generates revenues θtyt. θt ∈ {θ
l, θh}
is a parameter specifying the demand conditions for the principal’s output, with 0 < θl < θh,
and is realized after the output has been produced. High demand is realized with probability
p, low demand with 1 − p. These probabilities are independent over time, i.e., there is no
persistency in demand conditions. After the sale of output, payments wt and bt are made.
Hence, the bonus can be contingent on the realization of θ (in addition to chosen effort), i.e.,
bt(et, θt), whereas wt is fixed by assumption.
We assume that the principal is liquidity constrained: all funds used to compensate the
agent must be earned via the sale of its products. This implicitly assumes that the principal
does not retain profits earned in earlier periods and has no access to credit markets. We relax
the first assumption in Section 6.3 and show that it does not drive our results. The second
assumption is relaxed in Section 6.2. Furthermore, potential outside shareholders are not able
to inject additional funds into the firm in later periods. In this case, note that if they were
able at the beginning of the game to not only provide funds for physical investments but to
leave cash reserves in the firm to cover later shortages, our results would not be qualitatively
affected (see Section 6.3.).
Finally, note that although we do not further analyze potential interactions with outside
shareholders, their presence would not affect the principal’s incentives in her relationship
with the agent. Resulting dividend payments would just scale down all components of the
constraints proportionally and hence cancel out (see Fahn, Merlo, and Wamser (2017)).













Information, Payoffs, Strategies and Equilibrium
Generally, we assume that no contingent formal contracts are feasible. However, there are no
informational asymmetries between players, hence agency problems only arise because formal
contracts cannot be used to motivate the agent.1 More precisely, a formal, court-enforceable
contract can neither be based on the agent’s effort et, on output yt, revenues θtyt, nor on the
realization of the demand parameter θ. Still, all these aspects, as well as acceptance decisions
dt, and wage and bonus payments can be observed by the principal and by the agent.






δτ−t [π + dτ (θτf (eτ , k)− (wτ + bτ (et, θτ ))− π)]
}
,
where expectation is over the realizations of θ. Furthermore,
Π0 = −k + δΠ1.






δτ−t [u+ dτ (wτ + bτ (et, θτ )− c · et − u)]
}
.
We only consider pure strategies, and define a relational contract as a Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium (SPE) where after every history strategies determine a Nash Equilibrium. More
precisely, we are interested in a SPE that maximizes the principal’s expected profits at the
beginning of the game, i.e., Π0.
In the following, we focus on equilibria where the employment offer is accepted by the
agent (dt = 1).
In Appendix A, in Lemma 1, we show that, under the assumption that no formal contracts
based on θt can be written, we can without loss of generality focus on stationary contracts
that are independent of calendar time, as well as past realizations of demand shocks. Hence,
effort, wt, and bt are constant over time, allowing us to omit time subscripts t. This is driven
by shocks being distributed i.i.d., by effort being chosen before the state of the world is
realized, and by the principal – the party facing the liquidity constraint – being able to reap
the whole surplus. Hence, only equilibrium bonus payments might vary over time, depending
on the respective realization of θ. There, bh is the equilibrium bonus given θh is observed,
1See Englmaier and Segal (2011) or Li and Matouschek (2013) for an analysis of situations where shocks
to the firm are not observable to the workforce.
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and bl the bonus for θl. Finally, we set the outside options π = u = 0. This assumption
does not affect our results qualitatively, but simplifies our analysis given the firm’s liquidity
constraints.
3 Maximization Problem and Constraints
Our objective is to find levels of capital k, (stationary) effort e, as well as a compensation
package (w, bl, bh) to maximize
Π0 = −k + δΠ,
where
Π =
p(θhf(e, k)− bh) + (1− p)(θlf(e, k)− bl)− w
1− δ
is the principal’s expected discounted equilibrium payoff stream in any period t ≥ 1. Note
that an equilibrium that maximizes the principal’s profits involves no liquidation on the
equilibrium path.
The following constraints have to be satisfied to enforce a stationary SPE. First, it must
be optimal for the agent to accept an employment offer. This is captured by an individual
rationality (IR) constraint,
U ≥ 0, (IR)
where U = w + pbh + (1 − p)bl − c · e + δU is the agent’s expected discounted equilibrium
payoff stream. An incentive compatibility (IC) constraint must hold for equilibrium effort
e∗. For given bonus payments bl (after θ = θl) and bh (after θ = θh), this constraint equals
pbh + (1− p)bl − c · e∗ + δU ≥ 0. (IC)
There, we assume that the agent receives no further future offer after selecting e = 0.2
Because w ≥ 0, (IR) is automatically implied by the (IC) constraint.
Furthermore, because of the non-verifiability of effort and output, it must be in the interest
of the principal to actually pay out bl and bh to the agent, which is characterized by dynamic
enforcement (DE) constraints. There, if she fails to make a promised payment, we assume a
reversion to the static Nash equilibrium.3 This is characterized by no payments being made
2This is based on the assumption that once an agent deviated, the principal assumes he will not exert
effort in the future as well. The analysis would be identical, though, if the principal believed that an agent’s
deviation was a singular event, which is driven by the agent not receiving a rent in any profit-maximizing
equilibrium (derived below).
3Following Abreu (1988): The static Nash Equilibrium determines the lower bound on the principal’s
profits and should hence constitute her punishment following observable deviations.
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to the agent, who in return chooses e = 0. Therefore, if the principal reneges on a bonus
payment, she further will immediately shut down and consume the liquidation value of the
asset, k.
The two dynamic enforcement (DE) constraints, one for bl and one for bh, are
−bl + δΠ ≥ k (DEl)
and
−bh + δΠ ≥ k. (DEh)
In addition, a liquidation must never be optimal for the principal, i.e., Π ≥ k. Given
that bonus payments are non-negative, though, this condition is automatically implied by
the firm’s (DE) constraints.
Since the right hand sides of (DEl) and (DEh) are identical, only one of them has to be
considered, depending on whether bl or bh is larger.
Furthermore, payments must not violate the principal’s liquidity constraints, which state
that payments in any period cannot exceed respective revenues:
w + bl ≤ θlf(e, k) (Ll)
and
w + bh ≤ θhf(e, k). (Lh)
Finally, note that it must also not be optimal for the principal to liquidate the firm
and compensate the agent with the resulting funds. This however, is implied by the stated
constraints because a liquidation of the firm implies that no production takes place in any
future period.
Before characterizing equilibrium effort, we first derive the value of e that maximizes the
(unconstrained) total surplus. In the following, we denote this efficient – or first-best – effort
level eFB. For a given capacity level k, eFB is characterized by
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
fe(·)− c = 0. (FB)
To keep the analysis interesting, we impose Assumption 1, implying that operating is
strictly optimal for the principal.
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Assumption 1: There exists a k̃ > 0 such that δ
f(eFB ,k̃)(pθh+(1−p)θl)−eFBc
1−δ
− k̃ > 0
Given the concavity of the production function, Assumption 1 implies that investment
levels that satisfy such a condition also exist if first-best effort cannot be enforced.
Furthermore, we want the firm’s liquidity constraints to potentially have bite. Hence, we
impose Assumption 2:
Assumption 2: ceFB > θlf(eFB, k)
If Assumption 2 was violated, the firm would never be constrained by a lack of liquidity
and could always set bh = bl = ce.
4 Equilibrium Effort e∗
In this section, we derive the (profit-maximizing) equilibrium effort level – denoted e∗ – and
in particular explore how it is affected by the principal’s liquidity constraints. As a first step,
we can show that the (IC) constraint binds in any profit-maximizing equilibrium, and that it
is further optimal to set w = 0 (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A). These results follow from the
observability of effort and our focus on a profit-maximizing equilibrium. Hence, the principal
will aim at maximizing the total surplus subject to the constraints derived above.
Equilibrium effort is characterized in Proposition 1.







1− δ + δp
θhf(e∗, k) + (1− p)θlf(e∗, k)−
(1− δ)p
(1− δ + δp)
k, (DE-L)
and
ce∗ ≤ δf(e∗, k)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− (1− δ)k. (DE)
There exist values δ and δ, with δ < δ < 1, such that
• e∗ = eFB for δ ≥ δ
• e∗ < eFB for δ ≤ δ < δ, and e∗ is determined by the binding (DE-L) constraint
• e∗ < eFB for δ < δ, and e∗ is determined by the binding (DE) constraint.
Proof: See Appendix B.
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The (DE-L) constraint is obtained by adding (Ll) (multiplied with 1 − p) and (DEh)
(multiplied with p), whereas the (DE) constraint follows from (DEh) and (DEl) provided
bh = bl = ce∗. Concerning the intuition behind Proposition 1, note that the principal
can only implement eFB with bh > bl – because having bh = bl = ceFB would require
ceFB ≤ θlf(eFB, k) which is ruled out by Assumption 2. Put differently, the binding liquidity
constraint in the low-demand state forces the principal to promise the agent a larger bonus
in the high-demand state. The maximum size of bh, however, is determined by the (DEh)
constraint. Because the principal’s willingness to reward the agent is determined by expected
discounted future rents and not by current profits, her reneging temptation is higher in the
high than in the low state. If δ is sufficiently large, though, (DEh) has no bite, and eFB
can be enforced. For δ ∈ [δ, δ), (DEh) binds because the principal cannot credibly promise
to pay a sufficiently high bonus. Therefore, the interaction of constrained credibility and
constrained liquidity restricts enforceable effort. Note that δ not only depends on the surplus
of the relationship, but also on the volatility of earnings. This aspect will be made more
precise in the next section.
For δ < δ, cash shortage is no longer a problem but instead the principal has a credibility
problem also when demand is low. Then, (DEl) bites as well, which makes it optimal to set
bh = bl = e∗c, yielding identical (DEh) and (DEl) constraints.
These results can be matched to empirically documented regularities. Proposition 1 also
implies that on average, firms with a higher discount factor have a larger variation in residual
cash flows because a binding liquidity constraint forces many of them to pass all their revenues
on to the agent if demand is low. On the other hand, if δ < δ, the liquidity constraint does
not bind, and free cash flow is also available if demand is low. Given we expect firms to
pay higher dividends to their shareholders in case they have more free cash flow, we predict
dividend payments of firms with a higher discount factor to vary more than of firms with a
lower discount factor. There, Michaely and Roberts (2012) show that privately held firms
in the UK smooth dividends significantly less than their publicly listed counterparts, and
respond more to transitory earnings shocks. Michaely and Roberts (2012) conjecture that
this might be due to agency problems, which are more prominent in publicly held firms. We
offer an alternative but related explanation, because of a notion that privately-held firms are
supposed to have larger discount factors: Privately held firms are often assumed to focus more
on long-term goals – in particular with respect to their employment relationships – compared
to publicly listed firms. Take family firms, where for example a study by Price Waterhouse
Cooper (2012) identifies a larger commitment to jobs, which leads “family-run businesses ... to
have more loyalty toward their staff – people are not just a number” (PriceWaterhouseCooper
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(2012), p. 6). This makes it more likely that (DE-L) is the relevant constraint, implying
more variation in dividend payments.
In a next step, we flesh out that it is not only players’ impatience (i.e., a low δ) that
limits the power of incentives if the firm faces a liquidity constraint. This is different from
“standard” contributions like MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) or Levin (2003), and also
Halac (2015), where the enforceability of relational contracts is solely determined by players’
credibility and in particular their discount factors. We can show that the liquidity constraint
might bind – and hence effort be restricted to inefficiently low levels – even if the principal is
arbitrarily patient. This is the case if the principal’s cash-flow is very uncertain in the sense
that the firm makes high profits with a small probability.
Proposition 2 Fix an arbitrary effort level ê > θ
lf(ê,k)
c
, and assume a discount factor δ ≥ δ,
i.e., the (DE) constraint can be omitted. Then, for fixed values θl and c, as well as for a fixed
per-period surplus f(ê)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− cê, there exists a p such that for p < p, constraint
(DE-L) does not hold for ê.
Proof: See Appendix B.
A reduction of p, accompanied by an increase of θh in order to keep the surplus for a given
effort level fixed will eventually lead to a violation of (DE-L).4 This result is driven by the
combination of liquidity and dynamic enforcement constraints. When constrained liquidity
has bite, larger shares of the compensation package must be shifted to high-demand states,
ceteris paribus increasing the temptation to renege. Hence, the (DE-L) constraint is more
likely to bind if the expected surplus generated in the relationship is high, and if the firm
operates in a high-risk environment. Absent (Ll), the enforceability of an effort level e would
– for a given discount factor δ – only depend on the future surplus, independent of the exact
specification of p and θ.
To sum up, this section establishes a new potential enforcement problem induced by a
combination of the standard credibility problem in relational contracts with liquidity con-
straints. Even if the principal is very patient, her commitment in the relational contract is
limited if earnings are volatile.
5 Optimal Capital Choice and the Scope for Over-Investments
We now derive the principal’s optimal capital choice. At the beginning of the game, the
principal sets the optimal investment level k∗ to maximize Π0 = −k+δΠ, taking into account
4Note that given effort, θl, c, and surplus stay constant and also δ is unaffected.
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the direct effect of k on output, but also potential indirect effects of k on equilibrium effort
in later periods. If equilibrium effort is at eFB, i.e., if neither (DE) nor (DE-L) bind, the
latter aspect does not affect equilibrium capital k∗ due to the envelope theorem. In this case,







pθh + (1− p)θl
)
fk = 0. (1)
In the following, let k̃ denote the capital level characterized by (1).5 We can show that
capital is above k̃ if (DE-L) binds. There, we make use of the critical discount factors δ and
δ (as defined in Proposition 1), which determine if eFB can be implemented, or if equilibrium
effort is restricted by a binding (DE) or (DE-L) constraint.
Proposition 3 The optimal capital level k∗ is given by one the following cases:
• k∗ > k̃ if (DE-L) binds at k̃, i.e., if δ is such δ ≤ δ < δ
• k∗ = k̃ if either eFB can be implemented (δ ≥ δ), or if (DE) binds (δ < δ) at k̃.
Proof: See Appendix B.
If the (DE-L) constraint binds, i.e., if δ ≤ δ < δ, over-investments are optimal because
a higher value of k increases output and thereby the available cash-flow in each state of the
world. Then a larger share of the agent’s compensation can be shifted to the low-demand
state, thereby also relaxing the principal’s (DEh) constraint. More precisely, the benefits of
having a capital level above k̃ consist of a direct liquidity effect and an indirect credibility
effect. The direct liquidity effect is caused by more available cash in periods where the firm
faces a negative demand shock and where the liquidity constraint binds. There, starting
from k̃ (which is associated with an effort level ẽ < eFB) and increasing capital by a small
dk increases the feasible bonus payment by dbl = θl
(
f(ẽ, k̃ + dk)− f(ẽ, k̃)
)
. Consequently,




profits by dπ = pθhf(ẽ+ de, k̃+ dk)+ (1− p)θlf(ẽ+ de, k̃+ dk)− c (ẽ+ de). This raises total
profits Π0, because the costs of having a capacity above k̃ are of second order at the margin,
whereas the benefits of having larger effort are of first order due to ẽ < eFB.
Moreover, the direct liquidity effect also gives rise to an indirect credibility effect which
helps the firm in high-demand periods where it is not restricted by a lack of liquidity. In
these periods, the principal wants to pay a higher bonus bh, but cannot credibly promise to
5Because fek = 0, k̃ is independent of effort.
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do so because her discounted future profits, δΠ, are not sufficiently high compared to her
outside option, k. The relaxed liquidity constraint and associated increase of expected future
effort induced by a higher capacity increase δΠ by more than it increases k (which, again, is
because the benefits of higher effort are of first order, whereas the costs of a higher capacity
are of second order at the margin). Consequently, the principal can credibly promise a higher
bh, thereby further increasing implemented effort and equilibrium profits. Concluding, the
combination of a direct liquidity and an indirect credibility effect renders over-investments
optimal for δ ≥ δ.
If (DE) binds, over-investments are not optimal. Higher levels of k increase on-path
profits, but also the liquidiation value. The first aspect relaxes, the second tightens the
(DE) constraint. For k∗ = k̃, both effects just offset each other. However, note that if the
liquidation value of the asset is lower than k, over-investments are also optimal if the (DE)
constraint binds. This aspect is further explored below, in Section (6.1).
Also note that, because fek = 0, k̃ is independent of effort, and hence the optimal capital
the same when eFB is implemented and when (DE) binds. For fek 6= 0, the capital level
in both cases would not be identical, however in each case still characterized by condition
(1). Only with a binding (DE-L) constraint, k∗ is above the level specified by condition (1),
irrespective of the sign of fek.
Concluding, we show that the very lack of free cash-flow in some states renders over-
investments ex-ante optimal. This result stands in contrast to the classic corporate finance
literature (see, e.g., Hart and Moore (1995) or Zwiebel (1996)), where a reduction of free
cash-flow is regarded as a potential remedy to overcome over-investment problems.
6 Extensions and Robustness
6.1 Asset Specificity
To focus on the effect of capital investments on a relational contract with liquidity constraints
– an interaction that has to our best knowledge not been identified before – we have assumed
that the asset’s outside value corresponds to the invested amount. This assumption serves
to isolate our main contribution that investments in general capital can improve the perfor-
mance of relational contracts. In this section, we analyze the effects of the investment being
(partially) relationship specific. Then, over-investments are optimal even for a binding (DE)
constraint. The reason is that investments increase revenues in all future periods. Since
investment costs are (partially) sunk, the difference between profits in and out-of equilibrium
increases, and promises made to the agent become more credible. Such a result has been
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identified before, for example by Halac (2015). She shows that the hold-up problem (gene-
rating under-investments into relationship-specific assets) can be less severe in a relationship
where relational contracts have to be used ex-post.
Here, we assume that the resale value of the asset is γk, with γ ∈ [0, 1]. Everything we
derived so far remains unaffected, only that k is replaced by γk. Hence, (DE) and (DE-L)
constraints, which determine enforceable effort, become
e∗c ≤ δ
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
f(w∗, k)− (1− δ)γk (DE)
and
e∗c ≤ (1− p)θlf(e∗, k) + p (δΠ− γk) . (DE-L)
A larger relationship specificity of the asset, i.e., a smaller γ, reduces the principal’s reneging
temptation because the liquidation value of the asset (which the principal consumes after a
deviation) is lower. Therefore, both constraints are relaxed, and a higher effort level can be
implemented.
Optimal effort and investment levels, as well as the effect of the degree of asset specificity
γ on (over-)investments are given in Proposition 4:
Proposition 4 There exist values δ(γ) and δ(γ), with δ(γ) < δ(γ) < 1, such that
• e∗ = eFB for δ ≥ δ(γ); in this case, k∗ = k̃, where k̃ is characterized by (1) .
• e∗ < eFB for δ(γ) ≤ δ < δ(γ), and e∗ is determined by the binding (DE-L) constraint;
in this case, k∗ > k̃ for all γ ≤ 1.
• e∗ < eFB for δ < δ(γ), and e∗ is determined by the binding (DE) constraint; in this
case, k∗ > k̃ for all γ < 1.
Furthermore, dδ(γ)/dγ > 0 and dδ(γ)/dγ > 0; if either (DE) or (DE-L) binds, k∗ might
increase or decrease in γ.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Concerning the marginal effect of the asset’s relationship specificity on optimal invest-
ments, note the following: First, critical discount factors are increasing in γ, hence a larger
γ increases the parameter range where constraints bind and over-investments are generally
optimal. This is because a larger γ increases the principal’s outside option and hence tightens
the relevant constraints. If δ < δ(γ), a higher γ has two opposing effects. On the one hand,
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it tightens the principal’s constraints, which amplifies the benefits of over-investments. On
the other hand, the increase in the principal’s outside option is more pronounced for a larger
k∗, hence a larger γ reduces the benefits of over-investments. The latter effect is relatively
stronger in case the (DE) constraint binds, i.e., for rather low discount factors. For interme-
diate discount factors such that (DE-L) is the relevant constraint, the marginal effect of γ on
k∗ is more likely to be positive. In this case, over-investments also provide additional cash
in low-demand states, whereas the increase of the principal’s outside option only matters for
high-demand states.
6.2 Principal has Access to a Credit Market
In this section, we explore whether the availability of a credit market can solve the problem
of constrained liquidity, sticking to the assumption that the asset’s outside value is γk. We
argue that even if a competitive credit market where repayment can be contingent on the
state of the world exists, over-investments remain optimal for many firms. Potentially, the
principal can benefit from a credit market if her (DE-L) constraint binds (if the DE constraint
binds, i.e., if effort is solely restricted by the principal’s lack of credibility, borrowing obviously
does not help). Then, the liquidity constraint could be relaxed by borrowing in low-demand
and repaying loans in high-demand states. In the following, we will therefore assume an
intermediate discount factor where the (DE-L) constraint binds (given no credit is taken by
the firm), whereas (DE) is slack.
Generally, the principal needs an incentive to repay the firm’s debt – supposing that a
default leads to a termination of the firm or that at least the principal has no access to
any future profits generated by it. Here we assume that the asset can be used as collateral
for a credit (otherwise, a credit market could not increase implementable effort). Then, the
credit market can effectively be used to smooth payments to the agent and thereby relax the
principal’s limited liability constraint. Consequently, a credit market can actually help to
enforce higher effort levels, however over-investments will still be optimal in many instances.
Assume there is a competitive credit market for short-term credit where creditors also
have a discount factor δ, and that repayment can be made contingent on the state of the
world. Furthermore, repayment is required in every high-demand period (even if the principal
has not borrowed in the previous period; this “smoothing” of repayments is optimal because
of the principal’s DE constraint in high-demand states). A credit market with an interest
larger than the rate reflecting time preferences, or with repayment not being fully contingent
on the state of the world would reduce its benefits and get us closer to our baseline situation.
We denote the amount borrowed by the principal in a low-demand state by D, and the
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amount repaid in a high-demand state by R. Because the credit market is competitive,
pR− (1− p)D = 0, hence R = (1− p)D/p.
First, note that for a given effort level, the principal’s profits are naturally unaffected
by the existence of the credit market, Π =
p(θhf(e,k)−bh−R)+(1−p)(θlf(e,k)−bl+D)
1−δ
, where by con-
struction pR = (1− p)D.
Furthermore, recall that the constraints that determine (DE-L) are (Ll) and (DEh), which
– taking the consequences of a credit market into account – now amount to
bl ≤ θlf(e∗, k) +D (Ll)
and
−bh −R + δΠ ≥ max {γk −R, 0} . (DEh)
The firm also needs an incentive to make the payment R (i.e., −R+ δΠ ≥ max {γk −R, 0}
must hold), which however is implied by (DEh). Enforceable effort again is determined by
the (DE-L) constraint, which is obtained by adding (Ll) (multiplied with 1− p) and (DEh)
(multiplied with p), taking into account that an agent’s (IC) constraint will bind. Hence,
−e∗c+ δpΠ+ (1− p)θlf(e∗, k) + (1− p)D − pR− max {pγk − pR, 0} ≥ 0. (DE-L)
The left hand side of the (DE-L) constraint is maximized for chosing D = p
(1−p)
γk, i.e., such
that R = γk. Larger values cannot be collateralized and hence do not further relax the
constraint.
This implies that the principal uses the credit market if the (DE-L) constraint binds in
order to increase implemented effort. She will either borrow an amount smaller than p
(1−p)
γk,
such that the (DE-L) constraint just binds (and either eFB can be implemented or (DE) has
become the relevant constraint), or she will borrow an amount D = p
(1−p)
γk (if (DE-L) still
binds at this debt level).
Over-investments remain optimal unless eFB can be implemented. Moreover, note that
there is an additional benefit of over-investments in case the (DE-L) constraint binds at
D = p
(1−p)
γk. Over-investments relax the “constraint” D ≤ p
(1−p)
γk. Hence, having a larger
value of k creates more collateral and allows to take more debt in order to smooth payments.
6.3 Firms can Accumulate Retained Earnings
So far, we have assumed that the firm cannot retain its high-demand earnings in order to relax
the liquidity constraint in low-demand periods. In this section, we show that over-investments
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can still be optimal if the principal is able to retain earnings. Doing so potentially allows the
principal to temporarily increase the implemented effort level, and might or might not be
optimal if the principal’s liquidity constraint binds. However, over-investments continue to
be part of the principal’s optimal investment decisions whenever effort is restricted. Further
note that the following can also be applied to analyze the possibility of keeping part of the
initial investment as a cash reserve to cover later shortages.
To simplify matters, we first assume that accumulated cash is kept by the principal and
does not generate interest payments. Later, we show that over-investments may also be
optimal if the principal can keep the retained cash in an interest-bearing current account.
Now, retained earnings can be used in two ways: On the one hand, effort can be increased
until the next realization of θl. On the other hand, a given effort level can be sustained for
more than just one subsequent realization of θl. We relegate a general characterization of
the principal’s optimal behavior to Appendix C (where we stick to the assumption of Section
6.1 and assume that the asset’s outside value is γk) and only present the main result in this
section.
Proposition 5 Retaining earnings is optimal if and only if in the situation without this
possibility, the (DE-L) constraint binds (i.e., if δ is between δ and δ, as defined above in




pθh + (1− p)θl
)
fe − c > 0. (2)




pθh + (1− p)θl
)
fe − c = 0. (3)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Holding cash reserves is never optimal if only (DE) constraints bind. However, a binding
liquidity constraint alone is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for making it
optimal to retain earnings. Instead, the costs of holding cash reserves – delayed consumption
– might still be too high compared to the benefits of having higher effort in the future, which
is the case if condition (2) does not hold.
In Appendix C, we further show that after a cash stock has been built up and the principal
is hit by a number of negative shocks, effort is decreased gradually. Then, each low-demand
period triggers an effort reduction until all retained earnings have been used up. This parallels
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results in Li and Matouschek (2013) where implemented effort levels gradually decrease with
every adverse shock hitting a firm.
Note that the exact properties of these results rely on a number of simplifying assumpti-
ons. First, we assume that the liquidity constraints in high-demand states never bind. This
implies that one high-demand period is sufficient to replenish cash reserves to the principal’s
preferred (maximum) level, which gives rise to a “quasi-stationary” equilibrium. Without
this assumption, the level of retained earnings after a high-demand period might also be a
function of the stock of cash reserves preceding this period. Furthermore, we assume that the
principal can consume her retained earnings following a deviation. Therefore, retained ear-
nings not only relax the firm’s liquidity constraints, but also tighten its dynamic enforcement
constraints. This delivers an additional dimension of potential benefits of over-investments:
For γ < 1, those are relationship-specific in a way that retained earnings are not because
higher investments tighten dynamic enforcement constraints to a lesser degree than retained
earnings do.6 In any case, we can show that the possibility to accumulate cash reserves does
not eliminate over-investments.
Proposition 6 Assume retaining earnings is possible. Then over-investments are optimal if
in the situation without this possibility, either (DE) or (DE-L) constraints bind.
Proof of Proposition 6: If (DE) constraints bind, holding cash is not optimal and the
situation is equivalent to above – over-investments are an optimal response to relax the
constraint if γ < 1. If holding cash is optimal due to a binding (DE-L) constraint and
because condition (2) holds, effort never exceeds the level characterized by condition (3).
Hence, it is below the first best. The rest directly follows from the proof to Proposition 3.
All of these arguments can also be applied to a setting where we allow the principal
to keep cash reserves at the beginning of the game: Assume that the principal or outside
investors not only have the possibility to invest into the physical asset, but are able to leave
cash in the firm to make up for later shortages. Then, the tradeoff still amounts to keeping
cash reserves in order to increase future effort versus instantaneous consumption. Therefore,
over-investments would remain optimal along the lines of Proposition (6).
Finally, note that retained earnings are also costly for the firm because they do not
generate any interest income and hence cause a first-order loss in profits, whereas over-
investments at the margin only entail a second-order loss. This changes once retained earnings
can be kept in a current account and generate interest. In the following, we argue that as
long as the discount rate does not fully make up for discounting, over-investments remain
6This is apparent in the respective formulations that can be found in Appendix C.
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optimal. Again, we relegate an in-depths analysis of this case to Appendix C and just present
the main results: If the interest rate is denoted by r, maximum effort is characterized by
δp (1− p)
(1− δp(1 + r))
θhfe +
(1− p)θlfe − c
(1 + r)
= 0,
with maximum effort being increasing in r. Indeed, for r = 1−δ
δ
, i.e., the interest rate
completely makes up for discounting, the condition becomes pθhfe + (1− p)θ
lfe − c = 0, and
maximum effort is at the first-best. But even then, over-investments will generally remain
optimal – because for effort always being at the first-best with probability 1, the firm would
need an infinite amount of cash reserves from the beginning of the game. In all other cases,
there would be a positive probability that the firm eventually runs out of cash and has
to reduce effort below the first-best level. But then, over-investments are optimal because
those only entail a second-order profit loss at the margin. Furthermore, an interest rate
r = (1 − δ)/δ would mostly be associated with fully efficient capital markets – whereas in
reality capital markets are regarded to entail at least some inefficiencies.
Internal capital markets have been identified as an instrument to mitigate a firm’s ex-
posure to inefficient external capital markets. If firms (or divisions within firms) pool their
resources, they might use their funds more efficiently and thereby improve capital allocation.
But internal capital markets are also associated with inefficiencies; see Stein (1997), or In-
derst and Laux (2005). Therefore, this paper can be used to argue that over-investments
might be an appropriate “internal” alternative to address inefficient external capital markets.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
The present paper has shown that observed over-investments are not necessarily the (ne-
gative) consequence of agency problems between shareholders and managers. Instead, they
might actually be a second-best optimal response to contracting frictions: In situations where
firms face volatile market conditions and hence varying cash-flow streams, and where they
cannot rely on court-enforceable contracts to motivate their workforce but have to use relatio-
nal contracts instead, “excessive” capital investments relax liquidity constraints by increasing
the firm’s cash-flow base.
We did not allow for different kinds of investments. In our setting, firms facing binding
(DE-L) constraints prefer investment opportunities with less volatile cash flows, even at
the cost of lower expected returns. I.e., these firms would abstain from making R&D-type
(high-risk/high return) investments and rather grow their business in a conservative way.
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Hence, there is potentially an additional indirect cost of low contract enforcement quality in
a country: reduced R&D activity and on the macro level reduced growth.7
7We are grateful to Bob Gibbons for pointing out this implication.
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A Maximization Problem, Constraints, and Proof of Sta-
tionarity
Note that it is sufficient to regard equilibrium effort as well as compensation as a function
of the history of past shocks. The reason is our focus on pure strategies. Denote the history
at the beginning of period t as θt−1 = {θ1, θ2, ..., θt−1}, with θt ∈ {θ
l, θh}, and θ0 = ∅. Then,








































where bh(θt−1) is the bonus paid for history θt−1 given a high shock is realized in period
t. Equivalent definitions hold for bl(θt−1), Π(θt−1, θt) and U (θ
t−1, θt).
Then, the firm’s objective function is to choose k as well as e(θt−1), w(θt−1), bh(θt−1) and
bl(θt−1) to maximize
Π0 = −k + δΠ(θ
0),
subject to the following constraints, which must be satisfied for every history θt−1:
U(θt−1) ≥ 0 (IRA)





















Given both (DE) constraints, the firm’s individual rationality constraint, Π(θt−1) ≥ 0, is
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automatically satisfied.
w(θt−1) + bl(θt−1) ≤ θlf(e(θt−1)) (Ll)
w(θt−1) + bh(θt−1) ≤ θhf(e(θt−1)) (Lh)
Lemma 1 The (IC) constraint binds for every history θt−1.
Proof of Lemma 1: To the contrary, assume there is a history θ̃t−1 where (IC) does not
bind. At this point, reduce bh(θ̃t−1) as well as bl(θ̃t−1) by a small ε > 0 such that (IC)
for history θ̃t−1 is still satisfied. Furthermore, increase w(θ̃t−1) by ε and leave everything
else unchanged. This has no impact on Π0, as well as Π(θ
t−1) and U(θt−1) for any history
θt−1, hence does not affect any (IRA) constraint. Furthermore, all (Ll) and (Lh) constraints
remain unchanged. Finally (DEh) and (DEl) for history θ̃t−1 are relaxed and unaffected for
any other history.

























Furthermore, the remaining constraints are

























This allows us to prove Lemma 2:
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Lemma 2 w(θt−1)(= U(θt−1)) = 0 for every history θt−1. Furthermore, contracts are statio-
nary in a sense that effort as well as bonus and wage payments in equilibrium are independent
of the history of shocks θt−1.
Proof of Lemma 2: We first show that a (constrained) surplus-maximizing equilibrium
is stationary and subsequently that the principal can extract the full rent.
In a surplus-maximizing equilibrium, none of the effort levels can optimally be above
eFB. Furthermore, the surplus is increasing in e(θt−1) for any possible history as long as
effort there is inefficiently low. Now, take any equilibrium effort level e(θt−2) and assume
that e(θt−2, θh) 6= e(θt−2, θl). If e(θt−2, θh) > e(θt−2, θl), replacing e(θt−2, θl) with e(θt−2, θh)
would violate no constraint and increase the surplus. If e(θt−2, θl) > e(θt−2, θh), on the
other hand, replacing e(θt−2, θh) with e(θt−2, θl) would violate no constraint and increase the
surplus. Hence effort in any period is independent of previous shock realizations and might
only be history-dependent based on the number of observed shocks, i.e., on timing. There,
however, note that the structure of the game is stationary. This implies that the highest
effort level that is enforceable in any period can be implemented in all other periods as well,
and it is surplus-maximizing to choose the maximum feasible effort (subject to e ≤ eFB) in
every period. Therefore, it is without loss of generality to also have payments bh, bl and w
history-independent.
Finally, assume that w > 0. Now a reduction of w by ε and an increase of pbh + (1− p)bl
by δε is feasible, does not violate any constraint and increases the firm’s profits. 
Note that Lemmas 1 and 2 establish that it is not optimal to promise the agent a higher
continuation payoff in a low-demand state, i.e., paying him a rent in a future period when
demand is high. The reason is that this tightens the high-state (DE) constraints equivalently
and hence does not allow for higher effort levels. This would change if formal contracts
based on the demand state could be written. Then, it might be optimal to let a low-demand
realization be followed by a promise to offer a high fixed wage in the next period conditional
on the demand then being high.
B Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that the firm’s objective is to maximize Π0 = −k + δΠ,
subject to the relevant constraints. For a given value of k, however, e is chosen to maximize
Π. Furthermore, we show in Appendix A that (IC) and (IRA) constraints bind. Hence, we









bl ≤ δΠ− γk (DEl)
ec− (1− p)bl
p
≤ δΠ− γk (DEh)
bl ≤ θlf(e, k) (Ll)
ec− (1− p)bl
p
≤ θhf(e, k). (Lh)
It follows that one of (DEl) and (Ll), as well as one of (DEh) and (Lh) generally can be
omitted. In a next step, we show that (Lh) cannot bind in equilibrium. To the contrary,
assume it binds. Then, either (Ll) or (DEl) must bind as well because otherwise, bl could be
increased and (Lh) relaxed without violating any constraint. First, assume that (Ll) binds
together with (Lh). This, however, would imply that Π = 0, which is not possible in a
profit-maximizing equilibrium with positive effort. Now, assume that (DEl) binds together
with (Lh). From section 3, we know that setting bh ≥ bl is optimal. Hence, (DEh) has to
bind as well, implying bh = bl. Then, θhf(e, k) = bh = bl = θlf(e, k), which - due to θh > θl
- is not possible for e > 0.
Now, consider all effort levels with θlf(e, k) ≥ δΠ− k. In this case, (Ll) is automatically
satisfied given (DEl). Adding (DEh) (multiplied with p) and (DEl) (multiplied with (1− p))
proves the necessity of (DE-L). Sufficiency immediately follows: Assuming (DE-L) holds,
there always exists a bl ≥ 0 such that (DEh) and (DEl) are satisfied.
For effort levels θlf(e, k) < δΠ − k (DEl) is automatically satisfied given (Ll). In this
case, necessity and sufficiency of (DE) are obtained equivalently as for (DE-L).
To prove that e∗ ≤ eFB, we set up the Lagrange function,
L =






pθh + (1− p)θl
)





1− δ + δp
θhf(e, k) + (1− p)θlf(e, k)−
(1− δ)p














+ δλDE + λDEL
)





Hence, if either (DE-L) or (DE) binds,
(
pθhfe + (1− p)θ
lfe − c
)
> 0, and e∗ is inefficiently
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small.
Concerning values δ and δ, we first establish the existence of δ. To do so, we show
that both constraints are relaxed for larger values of δ, that eFB can be enforced if δ is
sufficiently large, and that (DE-L) is the relevant constraint to enforce eFB. To prove the
first aspect, we obtain the first partial derivatives of the right hand sides of the (DE) and (DE-
L) constraints with respect to δ, f(e, k)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)




θhf(e, k) + k
)
.
Both expressions are positive, hence (DE) and (DE-L) are relaxed by larger values of δ.
Furthermore, eFB can be enforced for δ sufficiently large because (DE) and (DE-L) converge
to e∗c ≤ pθhf(e∗, k)+(1−p)θlf(e∗, k) for δ → 1, which holds for eFB because of Assumption
1. To show that (DE-L) is the relevant constraint to enforce eFB, we set up (DE-L) for eFB
and let it hold as an equality:
eFBc =
δp2
1− δ + δp
θhf(eFB, k) + (1− p)θlf(eFB, k)−
(1− δ)p
(1− δ + δp)
k.
Solving this expression for (1− δ)k, and substituting it into the (DE) constraint for eFB,
yields
eFBc− f(eFB, k)θl ≥ 0,
which holds due to Assumption 2.
This, together with previous results, establishes the existence of δ above which eFB can
be implemented, and that for discount factors slightly below δ, (DE-L) binds and (DE) is
slack.
To establish the existence of δ, take an arbitrary effort level ẽ that is supposed to be
enforced. There, (DE-L) is the relevant constraint if the right hand side of (DE) is smaller








Condition (4) provides a treshold δ for a given effort level ẽ. This is not sufficient to
complete the proof, though, because δ is a function of enforceable effort, which itself is a
function of δ. Therefore, we show that, for a given effort level, a lower δ tightens (DE)
by more than it tightens (DE-L). This implies that for discount factors below δ (which is
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characterized by (4) holding as an equality), (DE) is the relevant constraint. We rewrite both
constraints as
0 ≤ δp2θhf(e∗, k) + (1− δ + δp) (1− p)θlf(e∗, k)− (1− δ + δp) e∗c− (1− δ)pk (DE-L)
and
0 ≤ δf(e∗, k)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− e∗c− (1− δ)k. (DE)
The partial derivative of the right hand side of (DE-L) with respect to δ equals
p2θhf(e∗, k)− (1− p)2θlf(e∗, k) + e∗c (1− p) + pk (5)
and the partial derivative of the right hand side of (DE) with respect to δ equals
f(e∗, k)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
+ k. (6)
(5) is smaller than (6) if
e∗c < f(e∗, k)
{
pθh + θl + (1− p)θl
}
+ k.
This condition holds provided (DE), hence for all potential equilibrium levels of effort. 
Proof of Proposition 2. As we fix the surplus, as well as θl and ê, a decrease in p has to
be compensated by an appropriate increase in θh. More precisely, taking the total derivative
of the per-period surplus, f(ê, k)
(
dpθh + pdθh − dpθl
)








Take an arbitrary high-state probability p where constraint (DE-L) is satisfied for effort
ê (if such a p < 1 does not exist for ê, we are done). For any probability p∗ < p, always
counterbalanced by an increase of θh that keeps the surplus constant, the right hand side of
(DE-L) equals
δ





f(ê, k) + (1− p∗)θlf(ê, k)−
(1− δ)p∗




1− δ + p∗δ
(p∗)2








 f(ê, k) + (1− p∗)θlf(ê, k)−
(1− δ)p∗




1− δ + p∗δ
(p∗)2
(
θh − (θh − θl)lnp+ (θh − θl)lnp∗
)
f(ê, k) + (1− p∗)θlf(ê, k)−
(1− δ)p∗
(1− δ + δp∗)
k








f(ê, k) + θlf(ê, k) = δ
1−δ
(θh − θl) (p
∗)2
−2
f(ê, k) + θlf(ê, k) = θlf(ê, k).
Since θlf(ê, k) < êc by assumption, effort ê will eventually not be enforceable anymore.





















θhf(e, k)p+ (1− p)θlf(e, k)
)
− θlf(e, k)− (1− δ)k
]
. Since θlf(e, k) < ce,
this expression is positive provided the (DE) constraint holds. 









we have to take into account the effect of k on equilibrium effort in later periods.



















If e∗ = eFB at k = k̃, where k̃ is the level characterized by −1+ δ
1−δ
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
fk =
0, the second term in squared brackets equals zero, and k∗ = k̃.
Now, assume that e∗ < eFB at k = k̃, which implies that either (DE) or (DE-L) binds.
In the first case, e∗ is characterized by e∗c = δf(e∗, k̃)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)








pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− 1
δfe (pθh + (1− p)θl)− c
. (7)
The denominator of (7) must be negative because otherwise, a larger effort level would
relax (DE), contradicting that it binds. The numerator of (7), as well as de∗/dk, are positive
for k < k̃, negative for k > k̃, and equal to zero for k = k̃. Therefore, dΠ0
dk
= 0 for k̃, and
k∗ = k̃.


















pθh + (1− p)θl
)






θhfe + (1− p)θlfe − c
. (8)
The denominator of (8) must be negative because otherwise, a larger effort level would relax
(DE-L), contradicting that it binds. The numerator of (8), as well as de∗/dk, are positive
for any k ≤ k̃. Therefore, dΠ0
dk
> 0 for any k ≤ k̃, and k∗ > k̃. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. Now, the relevant constraints are
ec ≤ δ
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)











(1− δ + pδ)
γk. (DE-L)
The thresholds δ(γ) and δ(γ), as well as according properties, are obtained as in the proof













> 0, where the last
step uses the binding (DE-L) constraint.
In a next step, we solve for the optimal investment level. The first-order condition of the





























Hence, there are no over-investments.
For δ < δ(γ), (DE) binds and (DE-L) is slack. Therefore, e∗ < eFB, and
de∗
dk





. This implies that also for a binding (DE), k∗ > k̃, and
over-investments are optimal. Furthermore, the (FOC) becomes
−δfe
(




pθh + (1− p)θl
)
fkc+ c (1− δγ) = 0.
This condition, together with the binding (DE) constraint,
δf(e∗, k∗)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− e∗c− (1− δ)γk∗ = 0,
determines effort e∗ and investment k∗.













pθh + (1 − p)θl
)










pθh + (1 − p)θl
)

















pθh + (1 − p)θl
)
fee (1 − γ) −δ
(









pθh + (1 − p)θl
)









where the denominator must be positive in order to satisfy the second order condition for
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a maximum. Hence, the sign of dk
∗
dγ
is determined by the sign of the numerator, which equals
−δ
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
















The first line is positive because fee < 0. The second line must be negative, for the
following reason: fe
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− c > 0 because e∗ < eFB. δf
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− c < 0
because otherwise, increasing e∗ would relax the (DE) constraint, contradicting that it binds.
Generally, the impact of the positive effect is larger if γ is rather small, whereas the impact
of the negative second term is larger if effort is rather small.
Now, assume that δ is such that δ(γ) ≤ δ < δ(γ), hence (DE-L) binds and (DE) is slack.













. This implies that
k∗ > k̃, and over-investments are optimal. Furthermore, the (FOC) becomes
−δfkpθ
hc− (1− δ) fe(1− p)θ


















(1− δ + pδ)
γk∗ = 0,
determines effort e∗ and investment k∗.












− (1 − δ) fee(1 − p)θ
l








































− (1 − δ) fee(1 − p)θ
l
− δp (1 − γ) fee
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where the denominator must be positive in order to satisfy the second order condition for
a maximum. Hence, the sign of dk
∗
dγ
is determined by the sign of the numerator, which equals
− (1− δ) fee(1− p)θ
l − δp (1− γ) fee
(



























pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− c > 0 because e∗ < eFB.
(





fe − c < 0 because otherwise, increasing e
∗ would relax the (DE-
L) constraint, contradicting that it binds. 
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C Optimal Firm Behavior Given Cash Holdings are Pos-
sible
Starting from the equilibrium we derived in Section 4, assume that whenever demand condi-
tions are high, the principal can retain some of her earnings. These cash reserves are used to
increase effort from the next period on. After a number of subsequent low-demand periods,
the cash reserves are used up and effort is down at its original level e∗ - until the next high-
demand period. In the following, we analyze to what extent retaining earnings is optimal for
the principal (for the general case where the resale value of the asset is γk, with γ ≤ 1).
Define m ≥ 1 as the number of periods a higher effort level can at least be enforced, i.e.,
m is the subsequent number of low-demand periods after which all cash reserves are used up.
Furthermore, define the total retained amount as sm, and the effort level in the first period
after sm has been accumulated as em.
Now, assume that sm has been retained and effort raised to em in the following period.
If the firm faces a low-demand shock in this period, the agent is compensated accordingly.
However, some of the retained cash is needed, and available funds go down to sm−1. Furt-
hermore, effort in the next period will be em−1. This process is continued until either all
cash reserves are used (and effort is at e0 = e
∗) or a high-demand shock allows to fill up
cash reserves and increase effort to em again. To keep the problem tractable, we assume that
income in a high-demand state is sufficiently large such that the optimal amount sm can be
retained in one high-demand state, i.e., we impose the following assumption:
Assumption A1: Assume the firm can retain earnings. Then, (Lh) does not bind in a
profit-maximizing equilibrium.
Assumption A1 implies that only one high-demand state is needed in order to replenish
the firm’s desired cash stock.
Profits
We write payoffs as functions of the remaining subsequent low-demand shocks before all cash
reserves are used up. Profits given retained earnings are at its maximum level are denoted
















Note that bonus payments are the amounts actually paid out to the agent. Therefore, the
reduction of cash holdings in a low-demand state enters the principal’s profits positively.











m−j + (sm−j − sm−j−1) + δΠ(m− j − 1)
]
.
After m − 1 subsequent low-demand period, higher effort can only be enforced for a























l − bl + δΠ(0)
)
are profits given the firm has used all its cash.
Objective
The objective is to find levels of m ≥ 0, em−j (j ≤ m) and the respective amounts of cash that
maximize Π(0), given the constraints derived below. Hence, we maximize profits given no
cash is initially available. It will turn out, though, that the respective strategy also maximizes
−sm + δΠ(m), the principal’s objective given cash could also be raised at the beginning of
the game (when capital k is invested).
Constraints
The following constraints have to be satisfied. For all j ∈ {0, ...,m}, dynamic enforcement
constraints for low- and high-demand states must hold:
blm−j ≤ δΠ(m− j − 1)− sm−j−1 − γk (DEl(j))
and
bhm−j ≤ δΠ(m)− sm − γk. (DEh(j))
Cash holdings enter the above constraints since if the principal reneges on payments
promised to the agent, it will also be optimal to consume retained earnings. Furthermore,
note that s−1 = s0 = 0 and Π(−1) ≡ Π(0).
Since (Lh) is satisfied by assumption, liquidity constraints must only hold for low-demand
states.
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For all j ∈ {0, ...,m}, we have
blm−j ≤ θ
lf(em−j, k) + (sm−j − sm−j−1) , (Ll(j))
where s−1 = 0 in LLl(m).
In addition the (IC) constraints must hold (where we already take into account that
agents receive no rent), namely
pbhm−j + (1− p)b
l
m−j − em−jc ≥ 0
for all j ∈ {0, ...,m}.








In this section, we first assume that it is optimal to accumulate strictly positive cash reserves
(which implies m ≥ 1) and derive properties of a profit-maximizing equilibrium. Then, we
work out conditions under which it is actually optimal to retain earnings.
First, we show that given retaining earnings is optimal, (DEl) constraints can be omitted.
Lemma 3 Assume m ≥ 1. Then, all (DEl) are automatically implied by the respective (Ll)
constraints.











≤ δΠ(m− j − 1)− sm−j−1 − γk (DEl(j))





≤ θlf(em−j, k) + (sm−j − sm−j−1) . (Ll(j))
The left hand sides of DEl(j) and Ll(j) constraints are the same. Therefore, if
δΠ(m− j − 1)− γk ≥ θlf(em−j, k) + sm−j,
33
DEL(j) constraints are implied by Ll(j) constraints.
To the contrary, assume there is a j∗ ≥ 0 where δΠ(m−j∗−1)−γk < θlf(em−j∗ , k)+sm−j∗ .
Reduce all sm−j with j ≤ j
∗ by a small ε > 0. This tightens Ll(j∗) which however will
still hold for ε sufficiently small. Ll(j) constraints for all j besides j∗ remain unaffected.
Furthermore, profits change by ∆Π(0) = pε1−(δ(1−p))
j∗+1
1−δ(1−p)
, hence go up.
It remains to show that no other constraint is violated by this operation. Note that
∆Π(m) = −ε (δ(1− p))j
∗
(1− p) ,




1− δ + δp (δ(1− p))j
∗
)
and, for any 1 < k < m,
∆Π(m− (j∗ − k)) =
δp∆Π(m)− ε (δ(1− p))k [1− p] (1− δ)
1− δ(1− p)
and








Now we can show that no constraint is violated if all sm−j with j ≤ j
∗ are reduced by
ε > 0:








































Hence, reducing all sm−j with j ≤ j
∗ by a small ε > 0 does not violate any constraint but
increases profits. 
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Lemma 3 implies that all DEl constraints can be omitted provided cash holdings are
optimal. This allows us to simplify the problem by adding DEh(j) (multiplied with p) and
LLl(j) (multiplied with (1 − p)) constraints for each j, which gives a set of necessary and
sufficient constraints (sufficiency follows from the same reasoning as in the situation without
retained earnings):
p (δΠ(m)− sm − γk)+(1−p)θ
lf(em−j, k)−em−jc+(1−p) (sm−j − sm−j−1) ≥ 0, (DE-L(j))
with s0 = s−1 = 0.
In a next step, we show that given holding cash is optimal, all DE-L constraints must
bind:
Lemma 4 If sm > 0, DE-L(j) constraints bind for each j ∈ {0, ...,m}.
Proof of Lemma 4: Assume there is a j∗ where DE-L(j∗) does not bind. Then, the re-
spective effort level can be increased without violating any constraint, thereby also increasing
profits. 
Lemma 4 allows us to plug the binding DE-L constraints
δpΠ(m) = e0c− (1− p)θ
lf(e0, k) + p (sm + γk)
and
(sm−j − sm−j−1) =
em−jc− δpΠ(m)− (1− p)θ


























In a next step, we can show that effort is gradually going down once cash reserves are
used in low-demand periods:
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Lemma 5 em−j+1 > em−j for all j ∈ {1, ...,m}.
Proof of Lemma 5: First, we show that em−j+1 ≥ em−j. To the contrary, assume there













Note that this leaves DE-L(j̃) as well as other constraints unaffected. However, this change
increases Π(m) and thereby Π(0):
∆Π(m)
(δ(1− p))j̃−1
= pθh (f(em−j, k)− f(em−j+1, k)) + δ(1− p)pθ












≥ pθh (f(em−j, k)− f(em−j+1, k)) + (1− p)pθ























where the last inequality follows from em−j > em−j+1, and from both effort levels being
inefficiently low.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that em−j+1 = em−j is not possible. To the
contrary, assume there is a ĵ with em−ĵ+1 = em−ĵ. Now, marginally increase em−ĵ+1 and





is set to keep DE-
































Finally, we can show that maximum effort em is independent of m.









− c = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 6: Note that if holding cash is optimal, all DE-L(j) constraints bind for
a given m, which implies that
p (δΠ(m)− sm − γk) + (1− p)θ
lf(em−j, k)− em−jc+ (1− p) (sm−j − sm−j−1) = 0
can be used to obtain the necessary cash for all levels of em−j. Then, the objective is






, which is obtained by using binding (DE-L)
constraints. Put differently, effort levels em−j are chosen to maximize e0. But holding cash can
only be optimal if DE-L(0) binds, in which case e0 is determined by p (δΠ(m)− sm − γk) +
(1−p)θlf(e0, k)−e0c = 0. Hence, the objective can be reformulated in a way to choose effort
levels em−j in order to maximize the left hand side of this condition, therefore δΠ(m)− sm,
and determined by setting ∂(δΠ(m)−sm)
∂em−j
= 0.































= 0 for j > 0 – because ∂(δΠ(m)−sm)
∂em−j
= 0 must be satisfied

















pθhf(em−i, k) + p (sm−i + γk)
)















− c = 0.

This result shows that a larger value of m does not increase maximum effort, but rather
“smoothes” the process of effort reductions after negative demand shocks.
Finally, we can prove Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 5: Lemma 6 gives condition (3) for maximum effort. Furthermore,
note that if retaining earnings is optimal, then em > em−1 > ... > e
∗. Hence, if maximum
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pθh + (1− p)θl
)
fe − c ≤ 0, holding
cash cannot be optimal. 
Here, we do not aim for solving for the optimal m, i.e. the maximum number of subsequent
negative shocks until cash reserves are used up. The optimal level of m would again be
determined by maximizing δΠ(m)−sm. To get around integer problems, we would first treat
m as a continuous variable, set ∂(δΠ(m)−sm)
∂m




Cash Holdings Generate Interest
Now, we derive the properties of an equilibrium if cash holdings generation interest r ≥ 0.
We assume that r ≤ 1−δ
δ
and that if indifferent between holding cash and consuming today,
the principal consumes today. Without the first part of the assumption, it would be strictly
optimal to never consume and instead save all profits. The second part simplifies the analysis
in case r = 1−δ
δ
, i.e., when the interest rate just makes up for discounting.
We stick to the assumption that the principal is able to retain her desired amount sm in
one high-demand period, i.e., liquidity constraints never bind in high-demand states. If this
were not the case, the benefits of holding cash would be muted.
As before, define the retained amount as sm, and the effort level in the first period after












m + ((1 + r)sm − sm−1) + δΠ(m− 1)
]
.
There, sm−1 is the amount of cash kept for the next period (in which the principal can
spend (1 + r)sm−1). Note that interest income is consumed by the principal if high-demand
states are followed by high-demand states. However, interest income is never consumed in a
low-demand state. If this were the case, a reduction of savings in previous periods would be
optimal.
To further simplify our analysis, we also assume that (1+ r)sm−1 ≤ sm. This implies that













m−j + ((1 + r)sm−j − sm−j−1) + δΠ(m− j − 1)
]
.
After m − 1 subsequent low-demand period, higher effort can only be enforced for a
























l − bl + δΠ(0)
)
are profits given the firm has used all its cash.
Constraints
For all j ∈ [0,m], dynamic enforcement constraints equal
blm−j ≤ δΠ(m− j − 1)− sm−j−1 − γk (DEl(j))
and
bhm−j ≤ δΠ(m)− sm − γk. (DEh(j))
They are unaffected by the interest rate. This is because, for example, the (DE) constraint
in a high-demand state equals
−bhm−j − (sm − (1 + r)sm−j) + δΠ(m) ≥ γk + (1 + r)sm−j,
where the term that includes interest payments cancels out.
As before, s−1 = s0 = 0 and Π(−1) ≡ Π(0).
Since (Lh) is satisfied by assumption, liquidity constraints for all j ∈ {0, ...,m}, which
are only needed in low-demand states, equal
blm−j ≤ θ
lf(em−j, k) + ((1 + r)sm−j − sm−j−1) . (Ll(j))







As before, all (DEl) are automatically implied by the respective (Ll) constraints if cash
holdings are optimal, and the following (DE-L) constraints are necessary and sufficient for
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implementing equilibrium effort levels:
p (δΠ(m)− sm − γk) + (1− p)θ
lf(em−j, k)− em−jc+ (1− p) ((1 + r)sm−j − sm−j−1) ≥ 0,
(DE-L(j))
with s0 = s−1 = 0.
























Still, effort is gradually going down once cash reserves are used in low-demand periods,
hence em−j+1 > em−j for all j ∈ {1, ...,m}.
Finally, we characterize maximum effort em in case retained earnings generate interest
payments.
Lemma 7 Maximum effort em is characterized by
δp (1− p)










Proof of Lemma 7: Binding DE-L(j) constraints yield
p (δΠ(m)− sm − γk) + (1− p)θ
lf(em−j, k)− em−jc+ (1− p) ((1 + r)sm−j − sm−j−1) = 0,
which can be used to obtain the necessary cash for all levels of em−j. Then, the objective






. Thus, effort levels em−j are chosen in order
to maximize e0. Holding cash can only be optimal if DE-L(0) binds, in which case e0 is
determined by p (δΠ(m)− sm − γk) + (1 − p)θ
lf(e0, k) − e0c = 0. Hence, effort levels em−j
























= 0 for j > 0 because ∂(δΠ(m)−sm)
∂em−j
= 0 must be satisfied


























= 0, allows to characterize em:
δp (1− p)
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